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Achieving Local Ownership  
 in Mine Action
Sustainable development is key to maintaining a self-sufficient national mine action program. 
To achieve self-sufficiency, programs must build capacity and transition away from the international 
community’s financial and technical support.
by Blake Williamson [ CISR ]
Until recently, the concept of a state’s government owning a mine action program was a more speculative than achievable goal. Sustainable 
development is an important aspect of maintaining a 
national mine action program. To achieve a financially and 
technically self-sufficient program, national authorities 
must be willing to commit to mine action goals and claim 
responsibility for mine action issues within their countries. 
In A Guide to Transitioning Mine Action Programmes to 
National Ownership, the Geneva International Centre for 
Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) asserts that sovereign 
states are responsible for confronting issues that exist within 
their jurisdiction.1 In a mine action context, these issues 
include landmine and explosive remnants of war clearance, 
mine risk education (MRE) and victim assistance. 
To help facilitate the transition process for mine action 
authorities and mine action centers, GICHD has provided 
a guide to assist in identifying goals according to national 
circumstances. Instead of using procedures that correspond 
to specific situations, GICHD recognizes that circumstances 
vary by country and provides “a structured series of processes, 
questions, suggestions and tools” to achieve a transition by 
A deminer works in Cambodia.
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assessing country-specific conditions, designing a transition 
plan, developing an implementation plan and monitoring 
progress throughout the process.1
Although the degree of control transferred from a mine 
action program to national authorities can vary, GICHD de-
fines transition as “the process through which the interna-
tional community reduces its financial and technical support, 
as the affected state develops the required national pro-
gramme management capabilities that lead to national own-
ership.”1 Notably, the transition process is not an end goal, nor 
does it mark the end of international cooperation. From the 
U.N.’s point of view, transition simply characterizes sustain-
able development, which is often a prerequisite for meeting 
mandate objectives.
H. Murphey (Murf) McCloy, an expert on post-conflict and 
conventional weapons destruction with the Office of Weapons 
Removal and Abatement in the U.S. Department of State’s Bu-
reau of Political-Military Affairs (PM/WRA), explains that the 
overall goal of centralizing control of mine action within the 
state is threatened by the issue of multiple mine action pro-
grams. This can be remedied through the presence of an or-
ganization acting as a coordinating authority.2 According to 
McCloy, this means that “the arrangements/compromises nec-
essary to centralize control of mine action within the state and 
keep separate programs from operating independently are eas-
ier to achieve.”2 In the event that local authorities or non-state 
actors exercise control in a loosely defined area independent 
of national authorities, non-state actors may maintain more 
influence in their local domains than authorities acting on 
behalf of the national government and will often see the finan-
cial benefits of independent programs, therein rendering the 
centralization of control impossible.2 While otherwise coun-
terintuitive, a program truly seeking self-sufficiency must be 
integrated into the government structure. GICHD ex-
plicitly states that “transition requires a commitment 
of more national resources with a parallel reduction of 
external assistance.”1 In other words, states must con-
sciously decide to support transition while compensating 
for reduced international funding to become successfully 
self-sufficient.
After making the decision in April 2001 to transition, 
Azerbaijan successfully transferred its mine action ca-
pacity to national ownership by 2004. Through its expe-
rience, the Azerbaijan National Agency for Mine Action 
(ANAMA) suggested that transition processes require 
three basic elements: “a decision as to what should be 
developed as the capacity of the programme, … a gov-
ernment decision to nationalize the programme, with a 
reasonable timeframe in which to gain experience under su-
pervision and then assume responsibility,” and “a strong na-
tional manager who understood the process.”3 According to 
PM/WRA, ANAMA’s ability to fund program needs inter-
nally and on a long-term basis is perhaps the strongest indi-
cator of the organization’s success.
In most countries, transition may take longer than in 
Azerbaijan. In very impoverished countries, national author-
ities may not consider national ownership of a mine action 
program to be a priority. For countries suffering from dev-
astated infrastructures and crippled economies, compensat-
ing for the withdrawal of external support from mine action 
programs is never easy. However, when international commu-
nity partners recognize and respect the host nation’s sover-
eignty, authorities will often feel empowered and remain more 
disposed to develop their own capabilities in a constructive 
partnership with the international community.2 Alternatively, 
in situations where the relationship between the host nation 
and international partner was formed under highly autocratic 
conditions, local ownership becomes significantly more diffi-
cult to achieve.2
On behalf of the state, leadership must be interested 
in and capable of fulfilling clearance obligations.1 Hence, 
to achieve a local buy-in, international donors should 
first select implementing partners that can empower local 
national leadership.2 Authorities must also possess a clear 
understanding of implementation challenges as well as the 
financial, technical and human resources necessary to fulfill 
Article 5 of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, 
Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-personnel Mines 
and on Their Destruction.1 Therefore, donors benefit from 
communicating with implementing partners and enforcing 
Mechanical demining in Laos.
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A practical, purposeful plan to complete 
implementation of Article 5 and a 
significant financial commitment to the 
national mine action program are also 
necessary.1 Moreover, the implementing 
partner must hire local nationals 
capable of growing with and providing 
leadership to the program. Notably, 
while the skills local staff learn from 
the international community will create 
desirable employees in and outside of 
the humanitarian mine action (HMA) 
sector, donors recognize that, when 
dedicated to local self-sufficiency, 
local authorities retain the ability to 
minimize the negative impact this 
causes within the local context.2 While 
these components will not ensure the 
success of the transition process, they 
will certainly improve the chances that 
those in need will receive support from 
those who can provide it.
Once national circumstances are 
identified, a transition plan and imple-
mentation strategy can help mitigate a 
country’s shortcomings. GICHD divides 
the transition process into multiple 
phases: assessment and analysis, devel-
opment, and implementation.1 While 
international donors may not prioritize 
the same objectives as their respective 
host nations, emphasis is placed first on 
core values and the mission of their re-
spective organizations followed by the 
affected host nation’s needs.2 Particular 
political environments may also affect 
the priorities of the host nation as well 
as the maturity of the local HMA infra-
structure, amount of available funding 
and conditions the providing authority 
places on the expenditure of funds.
To ensure a successful transition, 
appropriate measures must be taken to 
monitor the success of the process. By 
assessing the program’s internal condi-
tions, authorities can identify potential 
issues or constraints in the transition 
process. Similarly, when analyzing the 
program, national authorities are able 
to evaluate the current state of the tran-
sition process. Notably, key compo-
nents of a successful assessment and 
analysis will include a “consensus on 
the nature and size of the residual con-
tamination and requirements for MRE 
and victim assistance that the post-
transition structures will have to 
A deminer defuzes a landmine in Sri Lanka.
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address, government commitment 
(which is absolutely essential) and an 
effective advocate who will drive and 
protect the transition process.”1 
See endnotes page 51
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